In practice, the responsibility for detecting and dismantling covert campaigns has been left almost entirely to private companies, each with its own rules, incentives, and blind spots. Google and Meta have adopted policies requiring disclosure when political ads are generated using AI. X has remained largely silent on this, while TikTok bans all paid political advertising. However, these rules, modest as they are, cover only the sliver of content that is bought and publicly displayed. They say almost nothing about the unpaid, private persuasion campaigns that may matter most.
To their credit, some firms have begun publishing periodic threat reports identifying covert influence campaigns. Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, and Google have all disclosed takedowns of inauthentic accounts. However, these efforts are voluntary and not subject to independent auditing. Most important, none of this prevents determined actors from bypassing platform restrictions altogether with open-source models and off-platform infrastructure.
What a real strategy would look like
The United States does not need to ban AI from political life. Some applications may even strengthen democracy. A well-designed candidate chatbot could help voters understand where the candidate stands on key issues, answer questions directly, or translate complex policy into plain language. Research has even shown that AI can reduce belief in conspiracy theories.
Still, there are a few things the United States should do to protect against the threat of AI persuasion. First, it must guard against foreign-made political technology with built-in persuasion capabilities. Adversarial political technology could take the form of a foreign-produced video game where in-game characters echo political talking points, a social media platform whose recommendation algorithm tilts toward certain narratives, or a language learning app that slips subtle messages into daily lessons.
Evaluations, such as the Center for AI Standards and Innovation’s recent analysis of DeepSeek, should focus on identifying and assessing AI products—particularly from countries like China, Russia, or Iran—before they are widely deployed. This effort would require coordination among intelligence agencies, regulators, and platforms to spot and address risks.
Second, the United States should lead in shaping the rules around AI-driven persuasion. That includes tightening access to computing power for large-scale foreign persuasion efforts, since many actors will either rent existing models or lease the GPU capacity to train their own. It also means establishing clear technical standards—through governments, standards bodies, and voluntary industry commitments—for how AI systems capable of generating political content should operate, especially during sensitive election periods. And domestically, the United States needs to determine what kinds of disclosures should apply to AI-generated political messaging while navigating First Amendment concerns.
